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LIMITING THE WAYS TO SKIN A CAT—AN END 
TO THE 20 YEAR PERPLEXITY OF THE CAT’S PAW THEORY IN 
STAUB V. PROCTOR? 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1931, during the midst of the Great Depression, Henry Ford remarked 
that the economic crisis has fallen on this country because “the average man 
won’t really do a day’s work unless he is caught and cannot get out of it.  
There is plenty of work to do if people would do it.”1  “A few weeks later he 
laid off 75,000 workers.”2  Of course, this quote should not be interpreted to 
mean that all adverse employment decisions are the result of a deceitful and 
fickle employer.  This would be a clear overgeneralization of psyche of the 
average American employer.  After all, an employer’s choice to hire or fire one 
person over another cannot be easy.  The decision likely takes food off of an 
employee’s table and a roof from over his or her head. 
What it does suggest, however, is that there is definite need to inquire 
further into the motives of an employer.  Layoffs, pay-cuts, and reductions in 
hours are often the unfortunate side-effects of an unpredictable and fear-driven 
economy like the current one in this country, but overlooked in this madness 
are the underlying motives behind an employer’s decision.  While most would 
like to think that an employer’s decisions are made with the purest of 
intentions, statistics might show otherwise.3  In 2009, for example, an 
astounding 93,277 workplace discrimination charges were filed with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter “EEOC”), the second-
highest total in history, second only to the all-time record of 95,402 charges 
established in 2008.4  These statistics are not necessarily proof that 
discrimination occurred in each and every case, but they could be evidence that 
more workers are beginning to question the motivation behind adverse 
employment decisions. 
While employers like Henry Ford were surely making decisions without 
much consultation, the same is not true of decisionmakers in the American 
 
 1. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492–PRESENT 387 
(2003). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See e.g., Enforcement & Litigation Statistics All Statutes FY 1997 - FY 2011, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
all.cfm (last visited May 20, 2012). 
 4. Id. 
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workplace today.  Multiple levels of supervisors and managers regularly have 
some input in company decisions.  With layoffs, for example, although most 
day-to-day employee/employer interactions take place on a personal level with 
intermediate supervisors, the decision to terminate an employee may be made 
by a supervisor higher up in the corporate chain that has had little or no 
interaction with the terminated employee.5  Employers believe that objectivity 
is firmly entrenched in the decisionmaking process because seemingly 
independent and neutral decisionmakers higher in the company ladder are 
individually pulling the strings.6  However, a unique theory of employer 
liability has emerged in the context of this modern decisionmaking process.  
Employers may find themselves liable when an intermediate supervisor with 
biased intentions influences the final decisionmaker.7 
Adversely effected employees have begun to sue their employers under 
this special theory of liability.8  Even though the final decisionmaker had no 
discriminatory motive, the employer may nonetheless be liable if the biased 
supervisor’s input was relied upon in making the adverse employment 
decision.9  In the Seventh Circuit case, Shager v. Upjohn Co., Judge Richard 
Posner famously analogized this influenced-based liability theory to a 
Seventeenth century fable.10  The fable goes: 
  A Monkey and a Cat lived in the same family, and it was hard to tell which 
was the greater thief. 
  One day, as they were roaming together, they spied some chestnuts 
roasting in the ashes of a fire. 
  “Come,” said the cunning Monkey, “we shall not go dinnerless to-day.  
Your claws are better than mine for the purpose; pull the chestnuts out of the 
ashes, and you shall have half.” 
  Puss pulled them out, burning her paws very much in doing so.  When she 
had stolen every one, she turned to the Monkey for her share of the booty; but, 
to her chagrin, she found no chestnuts, for he had eaten them all. 
  A thief cannot be trusted even by another thief.11 
Posner cleverly correlated the fable to the underlying principles of the liability 
theory and coined what is now known as the “cat’s paw” theory of liability.12  
 
 5. Holli Hartman, Thinking Beyond ‘You’re Fired!,’ COLORADOBIZ MAG., Aug. 2005, at 
13. 
 6. See, e.g., Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 7. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 8. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 9. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405. 
 10. Id. 
 11. A CHILD’S VERSION OF AESOP’S FABLES 107–08 (J.H. Stickney ed., Boston, U.S., Ginn 
& Co., 1891). 
 12. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405. 
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The employer faces liability where the ultimate decisionmaker, the Cat, is 
unknowingly being influenced by the biased supervisor, or manipulative 
Monkey. 
The cat’s paw theory could hypothetically be applied to any cause of 
action that involves a question of intent.  Theoretically, it could very well be 
applied to any intentional tort claim where the actions of a party are caused by 
motives of another.  Yet, the legal application of this theory has been almost 
completely segregated to the employment law context.  The theory has been 
widely used over the past twenty years under a variety of federal 
antidiscrimination statutes.13  These statutes prohibit employers from 
discriminating against an employee because of his or her status as a member of 
a protected class.  Specifically, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin, has been the prominent statute used to challenge adverse employment 
decisions under this theory.14  The cat’s paw liability theory has also been 
applied to sexual harassment cases and to situations when employers have 
retaliated against an employee for reporting a bias or another violation.15  
Additionally, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (hereinafter 
“ADEA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter 
“ADA”), which protect employees from adverse employment decisions based 
on age and qualifying disabilities respectively, have also been battlegrounds 
for the cat’s paw theory.16  Finally, the Family Medical Leave Act (hereinafter 
“FMLA”) and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (hereinafter “PDA”) have 
also been stages for recent discrimination claims under the cat’s paw theory.17 
Given that this theory is still in its infancy, there should be little surprise 
that circuit courts of appeal have had difficulty agreeing upon a basic threshold 
test for determining liability under the cat’s paw theory.18  While all federal 
circuits adopted some form of cat’s paw liability, there was no uniformity, as 
courts applied a vast spectrum of standards for establishing employer 
liability.19  Specifically, the circuits disagreed as to how much influence the 
biased supervisor should have over the decisionmaker in order to attribute the 
bias of the supervisor upon the employer.20  Another matter of contention 
 
 13. See cases cited infra notes 14–17. 
 14. See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 15. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Colorado Dep’t. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1059 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 16. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Walgreen Co., 615 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 2010); Dwyer v. Ethan 
Allen Retail, Inc., 325 F. App’x 755, 757 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 17. See, e.g., Long v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 566 F. Supp. 2d 851, 860 (C.D. Ill. 2008), aff’d, 
585 F.3d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 1:07-CV-1118-DFH-DML, 
2009 WL 995755 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 2009). 
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. See infra Part I. 
 20. See infra Part I. 
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among the circuits was how much consideration to give employers who have 
taken affirmative steps to rehabilitate the decisionmaking process by 
conducting their own independent investigations.21  Similarly debated among 
the circuits was whether an employee should be barred from asserting a cat’s 
paw claim if he or she failed to raise the issue of bias when previously given an 
opportunity.22 
In order to settle the circuit split, in 2007, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the Tenth Circuit case, EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.23  
The case was fully briefed and set for oral arguments, but less than a week 
before the oral arguments, BCI withdrew its appeal without an explanation and 
subsequently settled the case with the EEOC.24  In the spring of 2010, at the 
urging of the Obama administration, the Supreme Court once again granted 
certiorari to a cat’s paw case, this time to the Seventh Circuit case, Staub v. 
Proctor Hospital.25 
The statutory context of Staub occurred within the confines of a special 
antidiscrimination statute, the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (hereinafter “USERRA”).26  Under USERRA, no 
limitations on an employee’s military leave of absence can be imposed beyond 
those required by the law (advance notice, cumulative time-in-service limit, 
and timely return to work).27  Even if an employer finds the time, duration, 
frequency, or nature of an employee’s military service to be unreasonable, it 
cannot deny the employee leave from work or refuse to reemploy the person.28  
Staub was the case of a fired hospital worker who claimed he lost his job over 
his service in the U.S. Army Reserve.29 
Since the cat’s paw theory was being examined within the confines of 
USERRA and not Title VII, some feared that the Supreme Court case may 
limit the precedential impact of the decision.  Ultimately, these fears were 
eased when the Supreme Court suggested that the statutory similarities 
between USERRA and Title VII made the Court’s holding in Staub applicable 
to future cat’s paw cases examined under Title VII.30 
 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 293 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(en banc). 
 23. 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007). 
 24. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (dismissing the writ of 
certiorari). 
 25. 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010). 
 26. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–34 (2006). 
 27. Id. § 4316. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 560 F.3d at 650–51. 
 30. 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). 
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Most anticipated that Staub would end the twenty year perplexity 
surrounding the applicability of the cat’s paw theory.  However, the Supreme 
Court failed to provide much guidance to courts, and instead, created more 
questions than answers.  Left most bewildered by this decision are the modern 
employers who face tremendous uncertainty in the wake of this landmark 
decision.  Staub has left employers with little protections against the 
discriminatory animus of someone who may have played no role in the 
decisionmaking process. 
Part I of this note will examine the brief history of the cat’s paw theory.  
Most notably, it will include an analysis into the theory’s recent emergence and 
current place as a point of contention among the circuits.  Part II of this note 
will examine Staub and the cat’s paw liability issues surrounding the case.  
Finally, Part III of this note will argue that the Supreme Court missed an 
opportunity in Staub to adopt a balanced causation standard that would allow 
modern employers to effectively maintain multi-layered decisionmaking 
processes. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE CAT’S PAW THEORY 
A. Origination of the Cat’s Paw Theory 
As previously stated, the origin of the cat’s paw theory can be traced back 
to the Seventh Circuit decision in the Shager v. Upjohn.31  Ralph Shager, a 
fifty-three year-old salesperson, was fired by Upjohn Co.’s “Career Path 
Committee” after his thirty-eight year old sales manager, John Lehnst, 
recommended that he be terminated.32  Believing he was fired because of 
Lehnst’s alleged animus against his age, Shager sued Upjohn Co. under the 
ADEA claiming age discrimination.33 
In his decision, Judge Posner recognized the inherent problem of imputing 
liability on Upjohn Co. when the ADEA is “silent on the issue of derivative 
liability.”34  Without direct statutory guidance, Posner analyzed the liability 
question in terms of agency principles.35  First, he explained that a biased 
supervisor acting as an agent of the employer could potentially subject the 
employer to liability.36  Quite simply, had Lehnst fired Shager directly (without 
the involvement of the Career Path Committee), Upjohn Co. would be liable 
 
 31. 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 32. Id. at 399–400. 
 33. Id.  Although the Supreme Court recently held that claims filed under the ADEA require 
“but for” causation, the cat’s paw theory is mainly based upon agency principles and is an issue 
of derivative liability and therefore, the causation analysis should be entirely distinct.  See Gross 
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). 
 34. Shager, 913 F.2d at 404. 
 35. Id. at 404–05. 
 36. Id. 
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on agency principles because he would have been acting within the scope of 
his duties.37  On the flip side, however, Posner admitted: 
Lehnst did not fire Shager; the Career Path Committee did.  If it did so for 
reasons untainted by any prejudice of Lehnst’s against older workers, the 
causal link between that prejudice and Shager’s discharge is severed, and 
Shager cannot maintain this suit . . . . But if Shager’s evidence is believed . . . 
the committee’s decision to fire him was tainted by Lehnst’s prejudice. . . . 
Lehnst was the district manager; he presented plausible evidence that one of 
his sales representatives should be discharged; the committee was not 
conversant with the possible age animus that may have motivated Lehnst’s 
recommendation.  If [the committee] acted as the conduit of Lehnst’s 
prejudice—his cat’s paw—the innocence of its members would not spare the 
company from liability.38 
Posner, by evaluating agency principles, gave birth to the cat’s paw theory 
of liability.  Since Lehnst had acted within the scope of his duties when he 
made his recommendation to the committee, his animus against older workers 
was imputed to the company because he had influenced the decisionmaker.39  
Left unanswered by this decision, however, was how much influence a biased 
subordinate would need to exert over the decisionmaker in order to spring 
employer liability to life.  In other words, an exact causation standard for 
determining liability was absent from the court’s analysis. 
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, some eight years after Shager, 
the Supreme Court endorsed the concept of cat’s paw liability (also known as 
subordinate bias liability), but it too failed to proscribe the proper standard for 
determining causation.40  Roger Reeves sued his former employer, alleging 
that he was terminated because of his age in violation of the ADEA.41  While 
not expressly referencing the cat’s paw theory directly, the Court held that his 
employer was not entitled to summary judgment because “[Reeves] introduced 
additional evidence that [one of his superiors in the chain of authority] was 
motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsible for [his] 
firing.”42  The Court noted that Reeves’ supervisor “was the actual 
 
 37. Id. at 405. 
 38. Id. (citation omitted). 
 39. Id. at 404–05. 
 40. 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000).  Even though the Supreme Court never used the phrase ‘cat’s 
paw,’ the Fourth Circuit has deemed that the Court’s language in Reeves should be the be-all and 
end-all under the theory.  See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 288 
(4th Cir. 2004). 
 41. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 138. 
 42. Id. at 151.  Although the employee’s supervisor only recommended the petitioner’s 
termination to the formal decisionmaker, the formal decisionmaker was the company president; 
according to testimony from a supervisor in the company, the supervisor had essentially signed 
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decisionmaker” and was “principally responsible” for his firing, but the Court 
failed to describe what these terms meant.43  It seems as though the Court was 
willing to embrace some form of cat’s paw liability, but to what extent?44  
From Reeves, it is clear that when the biased supervisor is the actual 
decisionmaker behind the adverse employment action, there may be liability 
imputed to the employer.45  What is unclear from Reeves, however, is whether 
there might be lower levels of subordinate liability causation that would impute 
liability to the employer. 
In Shager, Posner used the word “conduit” to describe the kind of causal 
relationship between the biased the subordinate and the ultimate 
decisionmaker.46  Circuit courts have had difficulty measuring what constitutes 
this “conduit causation” in the cat’s paw theory.  Further, since the Reeves 
decision is largely silent on the issue of employer liability for a biased 
subordinate, the circuit courts have been left to decipher the causation question 
themselves.  Without guidance for determining the proper causation standard, 
circuit courts have diverged widely in their causation standards. 
B. The Circuit Split 
Each circuit has adopted its own approach to decipher the causation 
question.  For illustrative purposes, the standards can appropriately be 
described as lying on a causation spectrum.  On one end of the causation 
spectrum is the Fourth Circuit’s strict “actual decisionmaker” approach.47  At 
the other end of the causation spectrum is the “tainted decision” approach 
developed by a number of circuits.48  Before discussing the standard that the 
Supreme Court developed in Staub, it is first necessary to explain how these 
two causation approaches differ so substantially. 
1. The Fourth Circuit’s “Actual Decisionmaker” Approach 
The Fourth Circuit case, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, is 
the prominent example of a strict causation approach.49  With this decision, the 
 
Reeves’ pink slip because employees feared the supervisor, and he had exercised absolute power 
with the company.  Id. at 152. 
 43. Id. at 151, 152. 
 44. See id. at 151–54. 
 45. See id. at 153–54. 
 46. 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).  Although is it not as prominent as the term “cat’s 
paw”, some courts have chosen to refer to the theory as “conduit” theory.  Other metaphoric 
descriptions of the cat’s paw theory include “rubber-stamp” and “vehicle,” or quite simply, 
subordinate bias liability theory.  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th 
Cir. 2006). 
 47. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 48. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 49. 354 F.3d, 277, 288 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
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Fourth Circuit became an extreme outlier among circuits.  Drawing directly 
from the Supreme Court’s limited language in Reeves, the Fourth Circuit 
requires that the biased subordinate be “principally responsible” for the 
adverse employment decision.50  The Hill court strictly interpreted the Reeves 
decision and stated that an employer will only be found liable under the cat’s 
paw theory if the subordinate were the “actual decisionmaker” behind the 
adverse employment action.51  The Fourth Circuit denounced any broader 
interpretation of conduit causation and dealt a serious blow to the future of 
cat’s paw claims.52 
Louise Hill, an aircraft mechanic at a military base, claimed that her 
supervisor, Ed Fultz, held a discriminatory animus against her because of both 
her age and gender.53  While she was employed at Lockheed, Fultz had 
referred to Hill as a “damn woman” and a “useless old lady.”54  After Hill had 
received several written reprimands, Lockheed fired her.55  She subsequently 
brought suit against Lockheed under Title VII and the ADEA, and also claimed 
retaliation.56  After giving special attention to the concepts of agency law in 
several Supreme Court cases, the Fourth Circuit swiftly dismissed any 
application of a lenient causation standard.57  The Fourth Circuit claimed that 
other courts had failed to accurately apply the cat’s paw theory because their 
interpretations did not comply with Posner’s original application of agency law 
under the theory.58 
Perhaps the most outlandish stance by the Fourth Circuit was its stance on 
“supervisory or disciplinary authority.”59  Without such authority in the hands 
of the biased subordinate, the court held that the cat’s paw theory is 
inappropriate.60  It stated: 
[W]e decline to endorse a construction of the discrimination statutes that 
would allow a biased subordinate who has no supervisory or disciplinary 
authority and who does not make the final or formal employment decision to 
become a decisionmaker simply because he had a substantial influence on the 
ultimate decision or because he has played a role, even a significant one, in the 
adverse employment decision.61 
 
 50. Id. at 290. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 291. 
 53. Id. at 282–83. 
 54. Id. at 283. 
 55. Hill, 354 F.3d at 283. 
 56. Id. at 281. 
 57. See id. at 290–91. 
 58. See id. at 289–90. 
 59. Id. at 291. 
 60. See id. at 291. 
 61. Hill, 354 F.3d at 291. 
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Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, the subordinate must be the actual 
decisionmaker of the adverse employment action and possess some kind of 
supervisory or disciplinary authority.62  It seems an employer would be 
immune from liability in situations where the biased subordinate was merely a 
co-worker or subordinate of the terminated employee. 
In a dissent joined by three other judges, Judge Michael fired back at the 
majority’s stance.63  He stated that the majority’s position “puts [the Fourth 
Circuit] at odds with virtually every other circuit, and it puts [the Fourth 
Circuit] at odds with the language of the statutes, which impose liability when 
an adverse employment decision is taken ‘because of’ sex or age 
discrimination.”64  The four dissenters supported the adoption of a more lenient 
causation standard, one where subordinate bias could be imputed to the 
decisionmaker where the biased subordinate simply has “substantial influence” 
on the employment decision.65 
The Fourth Circuit’s uncompromising adherence to some select language 
of the Reeves decision led to the adoption of this harsh causation standard.66  
Other than the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Staub, the Fourth Circuit is the 
only circuit to incorporate the actual decisionmaker causation standard.67  
Other circuits interpret the “conduit” language of Shager more loosely. 
2. The “Tainted Decision” Approach 
The “tainted decision” approach is certainly the most plaintiff-friendly 
standard among the circuits.  In contrast to most other circuits where the 
plaintiff needs to show that the biased subordinate had infected the 
decisionmakers,68 in the circuits that have adopted a form of the “tainted 
decision” approach, an employer could face liability under the cat’s paw theory 
 
 62. See id.  While it seems that this high bar would limit cat’s paw cases in the Fourth 
Circuit, there have been some plaintiffs who have met it.  See Schafer v. Md. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 359 F. App’x 385, 389 (4th Cir. 2009).  The court ruled that the requirement 
was met when testimony had established the biased subordinate had a significant degree of 
supervision over the formal decisionmaker.  Id. 
 63. Hill, 354 F.3d at 299 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. (citation omitted).  Other circuits have described the Fourth Circuit’s stance on cat’s 
paw liability as “inconsistent with the normal analysis of causal issues in tort litigation.”  Lust v. 
Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1182 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 65. Hill, 354 F.3d at 304 (Michael, J., dissenting) (finding the “substantial influence” 
standard would be an example of a more balanced causation standard). 
 66. See id. 
 67. As discussed infra in Part II of this comment, the Seventh Circuit uses the causation 
standard of “singular influence.”  Although the Seventh Circuit does not use the words “actual 
decisionmaker,” the two causation  standards are extremely similar to one another; thus, both the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits were notoriously on the strict side of the causation spectrum. 
 68. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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if the overall decisionmaking process itself was tainted by a biased 
subordinate.69  This subtle but importance difference is best illustrated by the 
First Circuit case, Cariglia v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp.70 
John Cariglia, an employee of Hertz, brought an age discrimination claim 
against Hertz when he was terminated after many years of service.71  Cariglia’s 
supervisor, James Heard, had allegedly misinformed Hertz executives about 
Cariglia’s performance.72  Witnesses stated that Heard denigrated Cariglia, and 
the district court found Heard had “made statements rife with discriminatory 
animus,” specifically that Cariglia was “over the hill,” “not our kind,” and that 
he “should not be here.”73  However, the district court found Hertz not liable 
because there was no evidence that the Hertz executives, the actual 
decisionmakers, had been influenced by Heard’s bias.74  The First Circuit 
vacated the decision because the district court had improperly focused on 
whether the Hertz executives, the decisionmakers, were improperly 
influenced.75  Instead, the First Circuit reasoned that the causation question 
should be analyzed in terms of whether the decision process itself had been 
tainted.76 
The First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits have also adopted some form of the 
“tainted decision” approach. 77  These circuits have held that an employer 
liability could be imputed even if the decisionmaker is entirely unbiased.78  For 
example the D.C. Circuit has stated: 
  When a [biased subordinate] . . . deliberately places an inaccurate, 
discriminatory evaluation into an employee’s file, he intends to cause harm to 
the employee. . . . [T]he employer—that is, the organization as a whole—
cannot escape . . . liability simply because the final decisionmaker was not 
personally motivated by discrimination.79 
 
 69. See Cariglia v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 85–86 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 79. 
 72. See id. at 82. 
 73. Id. at 80. 
 74. Id. at 84–85. 
 75. See Cariglia, 363 F.3d at 88–89. 
 76. Id. at 88. 
 77. See id. at 87; Stoller v. Marsh, 682 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 
F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 78. See, e.g., Cariglia, 363 F.3d at 87–88.  Theoretically, a manipulative subordinate may 
not even need to outwardly express his bias; if he merely gave one poor performance evaluation 
because he inwardly harbored some prejudice, then this might be enough to impute liability to the 
employer. 
 79. Stoller, 682 F.2d at 977 (citation omitted). 
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The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that “the discriminatory animus of a 
manager can be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker if the [manager] . . . had 
influence or leverage over” the decisionmaking.80 
3. The Middle of the Causation Spectrum 
The causation standards adopted by a majority of the circuits fit 
somewhere between the extremes of the “actual decisionmaker” approach and 
the “tainted decision” approach.  In EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., the 
Tenth Circuit fashioned perhaps the greatest argument for adopting a balanced 
causation approach.81  In BCI, the EEOC brought suit against BCI under Title 
VII.82  The EEOC claimed that Stephen Peters had been discharged because of 
his race.83  Peters’ immediate supervisor, Cesar Grado, allegedly held a 
discriminatory animus against Peters because he was African American.84  The 
district court found for BCI under the cat’s paw theory because the decision to 
terminate Peters was made by a manager who did not even know that Peters 
was African American.85 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court because it 
found that the manager had exclusively relied on the biased recommendations 
of Grado.86  In its analysis, the court disagreed with the extremely arduous 
causation standards developed by other circuits.87  The court first dismissed 
what it felt were too lenient causation standards developed by other circuits.88  
The court stated: 
This [lenient] standard apparently contemplates that any “influence,” the 
reporting of any “factual information,” or any form of “other input” by a 
biased subordinate renders the employer liable so long as the subordinate “may 
have affected” the employment action.  Such a weak relationship between the 
subordinate’s actions and the ultimate employment decision improperly 
eliminates a requirement of causation.89 
Although the court exaggerated the leniency of the causation standards in 
other circuits, its desire to eliminate hypothetical reasoning is well-founded.90  
 
 80. Laxton, 333 F.3d at 584. 
 81. 450 F.3d 476, 483–89 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 82. Id. at 482. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 483. 
 86. Id. at 493. 
 87. BCI, 450 F.3d at 485–88. 
 88. Id. at 486–87. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id.  The Tenth Circuit criticized a pre-Staub Seventh Circuit cat’s paw case for 
adopting a less rigorous causation standard.  Id.  However, the court mischaracterized the 
standard articulated by the Seventh Circuit.  The use of the phrase “may have affected” was not 
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Causation should not be viewed in terms of what may have happened.  A 
determination of what did occur should be the only relevant question.  The 
Tenth Circuit also quickly rejected the “actual decisionmaker” approach 
developed by the Fourth Circuit.91  The court explained: 
The Fourth Circuit’s strict approach makes too much of the phrase “actual 
decisionmaker” . . . . The Fourth Circuit’s peculiar focus on “who is a 
‘decisionmaker’ for purposes of discrimination actions,” seems misplaced.  
The word “decisionmaker” appears nowhere in Title VII.  Instead, the statute 
imposes liability for discrimination by employers and their agents, which in 
accordance with agency law principles includes not only “decisionmakers” but 
other agents whose actions, aided by the agency relation, cause injury.92 
The court’s analysis epitomizes the predicament that has developed due to 
the disparity across the circuits.93  As a midpoint solution, the Tenth Circuit 
panel held that a plaintiff must establish more than mere influence and more 
than mere input in the decisionmaking process to satisfy the element of 
causation.94  The issue should be whether the biased subordinate’s 
discriminatory reports, recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse 
employment action.95  The court maintained that the causation standard should 
be aligned with the agency law principles that animate the statutory definition 
of an employer.96 
The court also noted the importance of the employer’s independent 
investigation.97  Since a plaintiff has to demonstrate that the actions of the 
biased subordinate caused the employment action, an employer can avoid 
liability by conducting an independent investigation of the allegations against 
an employee.98  By independently investigating employee records and job 
performance, the decisionmaker is able to form his own opinions and cleanse 
 
presented as a substantive standard; instead, the phrase was used as a procedural benchmark (to 
highlight when a cat’s paw claim should survive summary judgment proceedings).  See Dey v. 
Colt Const. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 91. BCI, 450 F.3d at 487. 
 92. Id. (citations omitted). 
 93. Id. at 485–87.  The circuit courts have simply no guidance to delineate the proper 
causation standard.  Each circuit tries to fashion the proper standard for this broadly applicable 
theory by examining it under just one specific factual scenario and under one specific anti-
discrimination statute. 
 94. Id. at 487. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. BCI, 450 F.3d at 488.  It may be easy to think of an independent investigation like the 
recoil of loaded spring.  The employer may bounce back from a showing of improper 
manipulation by showing that decisionmaking process was indeed accurate even despite the 
presence of bias. 
 98. Id. 
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himself of the biased subordinate’s influence.99  An independent investigation 
by the decisionmaker may not need to be extensive.100  The court mentioned 
that simply asking an employee for his version of events may defeat the 
inference that an employment decision was discriminatory.101 
The Tenth Circuit’s causation standard in BCI is indicative of most other 
circuits that lie in the middle of the spectrum.  That is, these circuits hold that 
the biased subordinate need not be the actual decisionmaker, but still, a 
definitive causal link between the bias subordinate’s discriminatory animus 
and adverse employment actions is needed.102  However, it seems that the 
circuits in the middle of the spectrum are unable to pinpoint the moment that 
employer liability is imputed.103  They also have difficulty finding a broadly 
applicable standard.  Quite often, it appears that the variations in the factual 
scenarios surrounding cat’s paw cases make it very difficult to put a broadly 
applicable standard to words.  Also, even when a circuit is able to express a 
certain standard, there seems to be a virtual certainty another circuit will adopt 
some other variation of that causation standard.  After recognizing the variance 
in the causation standards, the Supreme Court was poised to finally decide the 
proper standard in Staub. 
II.  STAUB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL 
As previously mentioned, Staub v. Proctor Hospital is the case of a fired 
hospital worker, Vincent Staub, who claimed he lost his job over his service in 
the U.S. Army Reserve.104  As a member of the U.S. Army Reserve, Staub was 
required to attend occasional weekend training, as well as a two-week training 
program during the summer.105  Although employers may not always be 
thrilled about the prospect of working around a reservist’s schedule, they must 
nonetheless oblige to requirements of the statute without any discriminatory 
animus or retaliatory treatment.106  All reservists who meet certain criteria are 
protected from discrimination by USERRA.107 
 
 99. See id. at 488. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. As discussed in Part III of this note, the independent investigation defense is perhaps 
the only weapon in an employer’s arsenal that can be used to combat a potential cat’s paw claim 
if a justifiable adverse employment action was made in the presence of workplace discrimination. 
 102. Id. at 487. 
 103. Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: 
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 509, 511 
(2001). 
 104. 560 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 105. Id. 
 106. This statute is a federal law intended to ensure that persons who serve or have served in 
the Armed Forces, Reserves, National Guard or other “uniformed services”: (1) are not 
disadvantaged in their civilian careers because of their service; (2) are promptly reemployed in 
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In addition to his duties as a reservist, Staub also held a position as a lab 
technician in the angiography division at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Illinois.108  
Over time, Staub’s relationship with his supervisor, Janice Mulally, became 
strained as a result of his military reserve duties.109  Mulally expressed extreme 
animosity towards Staub’s service and duties; she even publicly chastised 
Staub when he requested weekends off for his mandatory reserve duties.110  
Mulally referred to Staub’s duties as reservist “bullshit” and scheduled him to 
work during his reservist training.111  She also occasionally made him use 
vacation time to attend his training sessions.112  Staub soon contacted Michael 
Korenchuk, the department head, and complained of the treatment from 
Mulally, but Korenchuk uttered his own animosity towards Staub’s reservist 
duties on several occasions.113  Because Staub was one of only two employees 
specially trained to work in multiple units at the hospital, Mulally implemented 
a policy that Staub was to report to either her or Korenchuk if he had no work 
in the angiography division.114 
On April 20, 2004, the tension between Staub and his two supervisors 
came to a boil.115  After completing his tasks in the angiography division, 
Staub attempted to report to Korenchuk before going to lunch, but Korenchuk 
was not in his office.116  Staub then left a voicemail on Korenchuk’s phone and 
went to lunch.117  When Staub returned to the lab thirty minutes later, 
Korenchuk came into the lab and asked Staub to come with him to the office of 
Linda Buck, who was the vice president of Human Resources.118  
Unbeknownst to Staub, Korenchuk had gone to Buck’s office while Staub was 
 
their civilian jobs upon their return from duty; and (3) are not discriminated against in 
employment based on past, present, or future military service.  38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2006). 
 107. Uniform Services includes the Armed Forces, the Army National Guard and the Air 
National Guard when engaged in active duty for training, inactive duty training, or full-time 
National Guard duty, the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service, and any other 
category of persons designated by the President in time of war or national emergency.  Id. § 
4303(16).  In addition, a veteran’s type, job duration, notice, character of service, and a prompt 
return to work are also required for coverage under the USERRA.  See id. 
 108. Staub, 560 F.3d at 650–51. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 652. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 651.  Much like Mulally’s disdainful comments, Korenchuk’s stated that Staub’s 
drill weekends were “a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers[‘] money.”  Id. 
at 652 (citation omitted). 
 114. Staub, 560 F.3d at 653.  This policy was also put in place because of Staub’s alleged 
disciplinary problems.  See id. 
 115. Id. at 654. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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at lunch and complained that Staub was once again missing from his 
workstation.119  Although it is not clear whether Korenchuk knew about the 
voicemail at that time, he did not mention the voicemail to Buck.120  Buck fired 
Staub for being absent from his work station.121  Staub filed a suit claiming that 
his supervisors were out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military 
service.122 
In district court, Buck testified that she terminated Staub based on 
Korenchuk’s complaint as well as Staub’s questionable employee record and 
various employee write-ups.123  Nonetheless, the jury found that Staub was 
unlawfully discriminated against in violation of USERRA.124  The Seventh 
Circuit reversed, holding for Proctor Hospital that there was no evidence that 
Buck relied upon the either Korenchuk’s or Mulally’s anti-military bias.125  
The court ruled that the jury could only consider evidence of Korenchuk’ or 
Mulally’s discriminatory animus if the court determined that there was 
sufficient evidence to support a finding of “singular influence” by Mulally or 
Korenchuk over Buck.126  Ultimately, the court found that Buck was not under 
the singular influence of any other employee and that she had conducted an 
independent review of Staub’s case.127 
The “singular influence” standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit can be 
characterized as falling closely to the strict “actual decisionmaker” approach.  
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis and use of the phrase “singular influence” 
paralleled the Fourth Circuit’s actual decisionmaker approach in Hill.  Seeing 
that another circuit had shifted to a stricter causation standard in favor of 
employers, the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in this case.128 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Staub, 560 F.3d at 654. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 655. 
 123. Id. at 654.  Staub was by no means an ideal employee; he had several disciplinary 
actions in his brief employment at the hospital.  Id. at 651.  It also appears that his communication 
skills and abrasive personality seemed to rub many hospital employees the wrong way.  Id. 
 124. Id. at 655. 
 125. Id. at 659. 
 126. Staub, 560 F.3d at 658–59.  Moreover, the court specifically questioned the evidentiary 
requirements under this special theory of liability stating, “[a]llowing the jury to entertain the 
cat’s paw theory and decide whether there was singular influence, but only upon a prior 
determination that there is sufficient evidence for such a finding, is consistent with Federal Rule 
of Evidence 104(b).”  Id. at 658.  The court concluded that the district court failed to  make this 
primary determination and found that there existed insufficient evidence of singular influence to 
allow evidence of Korenchuk’s and Mulally’s animus to be presented to the jury.  Id. 
 127. Id. at 659. 
 128. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010). 
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Strangely enough, in his pleadings before the Supreme Court, Staub took 
the position that this was not a cat’s paw case.129  Instead, Staub argued that the 
cat’s paw theory has no basis in the text of USERRA.130  Staub pointed out that 
the word “decisionmaker” is completely absent from the statute.131  Staub 
contended that Congress did not intend for the cat’s paw theory to replace 
ordinary agency law.132  He also maintained that basic agency principles 
should guide employer liability under USERRA.133 
In its brief, Proctor Hospital argued that USERRA does contain statutory 
authority that supports a departure from agency common law.134  Under the 
statute, if any anti-military animus is a motivating factor in an employer’s 
decision, then the employer will be held liable.135  Proctor further argued that 
even if it is assumed that agency common law principles governed the 
discrimination claims under USERRA, agency law requires that the person 
who ultimately caused the harm to harbor the discriminatory intent.136  Proctor 
contended that under the doctrine of respondent superior, in the context of a 
principal/agent relationship, if the agent is not liable, then the principal cannot 
be either.137  Proctor claimed that it could not be liable as the principal because 
neither Buck, Mulally, nor Korenchuk (its agents) were liable.138  Mulally and 
Korenchuk were not liable because Buck’s independent investigation made 
their actions not the proximate cause of any harm, and Buck simply held no 
discriminatory animus against Staub.139 
Proctor Hospital also maintained that the Seventh Circuit’s cat’s paw 
analysis (specifically the singular influence approach) is indeed applicable for 
USERRA cases.140  In direct contrast to Staub’s argument, Proctor argued that 
the text of USERRA itself makes it improper to hold an employer liable for the 
discriminatory animus of a biased subordinate who influenced, but did not 
make the adverse employment decision.141  Proctor further maintained that 
biased subordinates cannot legally cause an adverse employment action if the 
ultimate decisionmaker independently reviews the employment action prior to 
 
 129. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (No. 09-400). 
 130. Id. at 35.  It’s possible that Staub made this argument because he thought he had a better 
chance under an examination of well-established agency principles rather than the newly minted 
and judicially problematic cat’s paw theory. 
 131. Id. at 37. 
 132. Id. at 36. 
 133. Id. at 34–39. 
 134. Brief for Respondent at 54, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (No. 09-400). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 54–55. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 54. 
 139. Id. at 59–60. 
 140. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 12–13. 
 141. Id. 
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a decision.142  Since Buck had conducted her own independent investigation of 
Staub’s past conduct and employee records, Proctor was confident that the 
causal chain was broken.143  Therefore, even if the Supreme Court ruled 
unfavorably on the causation standard, Proctor believed that the independent 
investigation was enough to sever the subordinate discriminatory animus.144 
Some speculated that the Supreme Court would limit its analysis to agency 
principles or to claims strictly arising under USERRA, but it did neither.145  In 
an 8-0 decision, with Justices Alito and Thomas concurring in judgment only, 
the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision.146  The majority 
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, states “that if a supervisor performs an act 
motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an 
adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate 
employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”147  As 
applied to the facts in Staub, the Supreme Court held there was evidence that 
Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s actions were motivated by hostility toward Staub’s 
military obligations; and further, since there was also evidence that Mulally 
and Korenchuk had allegedly caused Buck to fire Staub, the Seventh Circuit 
erred in holding that Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.148 
The Supreme Court adopted an extremely lenient, employee-friendly 
causation standard in Staub.  Without expressly stating it, the Court adopted 
the “tainted decision” approach as it declined to separate the internal workings 
of employer decisionmaking processes.  Instead, the Court insinuated that the 
internal processes are nearly inseparable when discriminatory animus appears 
at any level. 
The majority opinion begins with a discussion of agency principles and 
proximate causation.149  It states, “[p]erhaps . . . the discriminatory motive of 
one of the employer’s agents (Mulally or Korenchuk) can be aggregated with 
the act of another agent (Buck) to impose liability on Proctor.”150  The majority 
 
 142. Id. at 39–40. 
 143. See id. at 46. 
 144. See id. at 54.  The Seventh Circuit noted that an influence cannot be singular if the final 
decisionmaker conducted an independent review before taking any action.  See Staub v. Proctor 
Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 145. Allen Smith, Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in ‘Cat’s Paw’ Case, SOC’Y FOR 
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/LegalIssues/FederalResources/ 
Pages/SupremeCatsPaw.aspx.  The majority opinion states that the statute is “very similar to Title 
VII,” which provides a hint that the cat’s paw analysis in Staub will be fully applicable to claims 
arising under Title VII and any other of the federal antidiscrimination statutes that employ the 
“motivating factor” language. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). 
 146. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1186, 1194. 
 147. Id. at 1194 (footnote omitted). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. 1190–92. 
 150. Id. at 1191. 
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opinion goes on to state that both the animus and the action itself can be 
attributed to an earlier agent if the adverse action is an intended consequence 
of the earlier agent’s conduct.151  The majority sternly rejects Proctor’s 
contention that the person who ultimately causes the harm also needs to be the 
person to harbor the discriminatory intent.152  The majority states “the exercise 
of judgment by the decisionmaker does not prevent the earlier agent’s action 
(and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory animus) from being the proximate 
cause of the harm.”153 
As unexpected as the adoption of a lenient causation standard was, even 
more surprising was the majority’s harsh treatment of the independent 
investigation defense.  It is obvious that the majority has a very pessimistic 
view of employers’ independent investigations.154  At first, the Court seems to 
reject the defense outright, but the Court merely rejects it as a bright line rule 
that holds a claim-preclusive effect.155  The majority opinion states: 
  Proctor suggests that even if the decisionmaker’s mere exercise of 
independent judgment does not suffice to negate the effect of the prior 
discrimination, at least the decisionmaker’s independent investigation (and 
rejection) of the employee’s allegations of discriminatory animus ought to do 
so.  We decline to adopt such a hard-and-fast rule.156 
This majority’s lengthy discussion on this tangential topic, however, seems 
misplaced.  Proctor never advocated that the mere conduction of an 
independent investigation defense should be a bright line rule to defeat all 
allegations of discriminatory animus.  The majority discusses its potential 
bright line status because of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.157  However, 
the majority mistakenly interprets Justice Alito’s views about the independent 
investigation defense.  Nowhere in the concurring opinion does Justice Alito 
state that merely conducting any type of independent investigation 
automatically relieves an employer of liability.158  Justice Alito simply warns 
that there are times when a “reasonable investigation” can be conducted to 
 
 151. Id. at 1192. 
 152. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192; contra Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 12–13. 
 153. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192. 
 154. See id. at 1193. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1195 (Alito, J., concurring). The concurring opinion states that liability should not 
be allocated to an employer “where the officer with formal decisionmaking responsibility, having 
been alerted to the possibility that adverse information may be tainted, undertakes a reasonable 
investigation and finds insufficient evidence to dispute the accuracy of that information.”  Id. 
 158. Id. at 1195–96. 
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separate the accurate information from the tainted information.159  The 
concurring Justices advocate that the independent investigation defense needs 
to remain a tool to shield employers from liability, especially when the facts 
indicate that an employee was terminated for reasons unrelated to the alleged 
discriminatory animus.160  The majority eventually admits that the independent 
investigation is a potential affirmative defense, as it states: 
[I]f the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons 
unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action . . . then the employer will 
not be liable. But the supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal factor if 
the independent investigation takes it into account without determining that the 
adverse action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely 
justified.161 
Although the preceding statement by the majority carves out room for the 
independent investigation defense when it is conducted properly, the majority 
strangely continues to berate the defense.162  More specifically, the majority 
continues to berate the suggestion that the mere conduction of an independent 
investigation has a claim-preclusive effect.163  It is baffling why the majority 
dwells on the issue of bright line status when there was simply no suggestion 
to begin with.  This portion of the opinion certainly seems to contradict the 
majority’s previous acceptance of the independent investigation defense.  
However, it is important to note that despite the majority opinion’s extreme 
skepticism of the independent investigation defense, the defense does remain 
available after Staub. 
III.  THE APPROPRIATE CAUSATION STANDARD AND INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATION 
It is easy to see how a modern employer faces increased uncertainty after 
Staub v. Proctor Hopsital.  Previously established workplace decisionmaking 
protocols may now no longer be in compliance with federal and state 
discrimination statutes.  For instance, modern corporations often establish 
multi-layered managerial structures to ensure that employment decisions are 
made efficiently and unbiasedly.  However, that same multi-layered structure 
may now ironically open up the corporation to liability if a biased employee 
 
 159. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1195–96 (Alito, J., concurring).  The concurring opinion also differs 
from majority in stating that cat’s paw liability doesn’t always exist when the independent 
investigation relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor.  Id. 
 160. Id. at 1195. 
 161. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
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even so slightly influences the decisionmaking process.164  After Staub, despite 
an employer’s good faith efforts to establish decisionmaker independency, it 
appears that disproving a cat’s paw claim will be an uphill battle when some 
workplace prejudices may have been present. 
Instead of creating greater uncertainty, the Supreme Court should have 
adopted a causation standard that would enable employers to effectively 
establish a multi-level decisionmaking structure that is capable of making 
efficient decisions while carefully shielding off any potential workplace 
prejudices.  This causation standard would need to be consistent with the 
language of a vast array of federal discrimination statutes and at the same time, 
be flexible enough to apply to a variety of employment situations.  For these 
reasons, the Supreme Court should have focused on what is the most important 
feature of the causation standard: its ability to function efficiently and 
practically for the multitude of employers who are faced with the complexities 
of the modern workplace. 
The Supreme Court had a number of options from which to try to gauge 
this causation standard.  For example, it had the option of choosing one of the 
two standards at the ends of the causation spectrum, or it could have 
implemented a standard from one or more of the middle ground circuits within 
the spectrum.  Ultimately, the Court chose to adopt a causation standard that is 
very much like the tainted decision approach.165  While the extreme standards 
at the ends of the spectrum present their own advantages to the modern 
workplace, in the long run, the adoption of a standard in the middle of 
spectrum would have been the most practical and beneficial to employees and 
employers alike. 
In addition to embracing a balanced causation standard, the Supreme Court 
should also have clearly acknowledged that a properly conducted independent 
investigation will relieve an employer of cat’s paw liability.166  Only one 
sentence in the majority opinion gave credence to the use of an independent 
investigation.167  The Court failed to outline how an employer should conduct 
independent investigations, and thus, employers are now left in the dark about 
whether their own independent investigations will continue to be effective. 
 
 164. Michele J. Gelfand et al., Discrimination In Organizations: An Organizational-Level 
Systems Perspective 23–24 (Ctr. for Advanced Human Res. Studies, Cornell Univ., Working 
Paper No. 07-08, 2007).  The dichotomy between organizational stability and compliance with 
federal anti-discrimination regulations often puts employers in a predicament.  The cat’s paw 
theory is one more thorn in the side of employers who seek to accomplish both efficiently. 
 165. See supra Part II. 
 166. MAX MULLER, THE MANAGER’S GUIDE TO HR 189–190 (2009). 
 167. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193. 
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A. The Functionality of the Staub Standard 
The Supreme Court was wise not to adopt the “actual decisionmaker” 
approach or another strict causation standard.  One can simply look to the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Staub to see how employers unfairly benefit from 
an adoption of this approach.168  Even when a biased employee or employees 
may have given some input to the formal decisionmaker, an employer will not 
be found liable unless the causal connection was so strong that the biased 
employee became the actual decisionmaker.169  Employers would seemingly 
have significant leeway in their workplace processes before they would be 
faced with cat’s paw liability. 
In the long term, the adoption of a strict causation standard would also 
have immense implications upon the average workplace environment.  Over 
the course of time, it is highly likely that employers would recognize their 
growing immunity from cat’s paw liability.  Employers would begin to realize 
that some of their anti-discrimination outlays and preventive programs now 
seem to go to waste.  They would begin to cut corners and possibly realize that 
even the mere appearance of independent decisionmaking could eliminate 
potential cat’s paw liability.  Employers would become largely indifferent to 
their workplace processes because there would be no financial incentive to 
improve or even maintain their existing anti-discrimination processes.  As part 
of a trickledown effect, the formal decisionmakers would subsequently be 
content with satisfying the minimum requirements that would ensure a kind of 
“independence charade.”  The biased subordinates would also likely face fewer 
consequences for expressing their workplace prejudices.170  Thus, with the 
dwindling threat of liability, the relaxed and content employer could be 
inviting a type of discriminatory culture to foster and surface.171 
As an illustration of this effect, imagine a potential version of Proctor 
Hospital in a world where a strict standard is adopted.  Once Proctor Hospital 
realizes that it would not be liable for Mullaly’s and Korenchuk’s biases, it has 
little financial incentive to prohibit their discriminatory animus in the future.  
Buck would have little motivation to discourage the biased behavior because 
there would be almost no pressure from hospital administrators to correct it.  
Likewise, Mullaly and Korenchuk would have no incentive to change how 
they manage their units because their actions are ultimately safeguarded by 
Buck’s formal decisionmaking.  Suppose a new employee is hired to fill 
Staub’s position, and a month after he is hired, he joins the U.S. Army 
Reserves.  Mullaly and Korenchuk could theoretically continue in their 
 
 168. See 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 169. See id. at 657. 
 170. Gelfand et al., supra note 164, at 23. 
 171. Id. at 14 (“[W]hen management fails to punish discriminatory behaviors, employees may 
assume that such discriminatory actions are acceptable, which then perpetuates such acts.”). 
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disapproval of military obligations and effectively establish an anti-military 
atmosphere.172  Then, once they conveniently have enough evidence of his 
subpar work performance, Buck could freely terminate him.  While some 
might view this as an unlikely and extremely cynical scenario, this glum 
outlook could certainly become part of reality.  Maybe this would not have 
occurred in every company or even in the majority of companies, but 
somewhere, on some level, the adoption of a strict causation standard could be 
an invitation to an enduring environment of discrimination. 
Conversely, the lenient causation standard developed in Staub will 
certainly help to improve the multi-layered managerial structures that are the 
habitual stage of cat’s paw claims.  Obviously, the complexity of modern 
companies makes it more efficient and more cost-effective to establish a multi-
layer decisionmaking process.173  However, these structures are also 
implemented because they help counteract biases held by individual 
employees.174  They provide protection against liability that might result if a 
single biased employee was solely making employment decisions.175  
Employers establish these multilayered managerial structures partially because 
they are an internal check on their own decisionmaking processes.176  As a 
result of these internal checks, discriminatory terminations are reduced and 
prejudice-based obstacles are removed.  Using this logic, the new lenient 
causation standard will likely provide additional incentives for employers to 
eliminate the power of prejudice in the workplace. 
Employers will carefully and rigorously review their internal workplace 
decisionmaking processes to ensure that they are able to sift through 
managerial prejudices.  Formal decisionmakers, managers, and employees 
alike would be subjected to higher standards of workplace conduct and review.  
Every adverse employment action would be reviewed numerous times, each 
with extreme skepticism and concern.  Accordingly, an employer’s workplace 
culture would become less inhibited by biased subordinates because the 
increased attention to unbiased decisionmaking would largely sift out 
discriminatory sentiments. 
However, while the new lenient causation standard approach has the 
potential to reduce discriminatory actions, the adoption of this standard would 
 
 172. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1195 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito notes that the 
majority’s lenient causation standard may have a similar cultural effect, as he states that the 
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 176. Id. at 14. 
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also create tremendous burdens on employers.  The inherent problem with the 
adoption of a lenient causation standard is that it fails to consider the logistical 
realities of the workplace.177  It is both procedurally burdensome and 
financially impractical.  Now, countless man-hours will be spent ensuring that 
all employment decisions were void of any discriminatory animus.  For a 
smaller company, the cost spent shielding itself from cat’s paw liability may 
eventually outweigh the pecuniary loss it would have incurred.  Additionally, 
for larger corporations, there would be an increase in the legal fees that a 
company would have to spend defending itself.  No matter how carefully an 
employer could be in reshaping its workplace processes under such a standard, 
the amount of wrongful termination claims will certainly multiply.  Companies 
will incur considerable time litigating whether any part of a supervisor’s 
animus impacted an adverse employment decision.  Thus, while this new 
lenient causation standard has the potential to remove a considerable amount of 
discrimination from the average workplace environment, it will result in too 
many impractical obligations and tremendous costs for employers.178 
The unfortunate side effects that result from the adoption of a standard at 
either end of the spectrum make it apparent that a standard fashioned from the 
middle spectrum is the only viable choice.  A balanced causation standard 
would eliminate several concerns for employers.  First, the financial 
expenditures that go to combating workplace biases would be significantly less 
under a balanced causation standard than under the lenient standard.  
Employers would also not be extensively burdened by the replacement and 
review of all their workplace decisionmaking protocols.  These reduced 
burdens would also occur without long term side effects that would come with 
the adoption of a strict causation approach.  Employers would not grow 
complacent in fighting workplace discrimination, and employees would still be 
provided with the protections from superficial decisionmaking processes. 
Secondly, the adoption of a balanced approach corresponds with the 
Supreme Court’s prior employment discrimination decisions.179  Title VII, for 
example, prohibits employers from discriminating against employees “because 
of” protected characteristics.180  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit stated that cat’s 
paw liability is imputed if the biased subordinate “caused the adverse 
employment action.”181  The standards are certainly more analogous to one 
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another than either extreme standard.  Also, since most circuits had 
implemented a balance standard, employers would not have to expend 
tremendous time amending their existing protocols.  Therefore under a 
balanced standard, employers may better structure all of their 
antidiscrimination polices, and employees would remain protected under 
federal discrimination laws. 
B. The Independent Investigation: The Ace in the Hole 
Entirely separate from the causation question, but equally as important, is 
how an employer’s independent investigations will hold up after Staub.  For a 
host of sensible reasons, the independent investigation by the formal 
decisionmaker needs to remain a powerful shield for employers in cat’s paw 
cases.  It is the only viable action available for employers to effectively make 
workplace decisions once someone’s bias has reared its ugly head.  Workplace 
biases, after all, are certain to exist.182  Whether these biases are revealed 
through explicit comments or remain entirely undisclosed, eventually, they are 
bound to affect even the smallest employer.183  Employers need a mechanism 
to sift through these biases.  It is the independent investigation that allows the 
employer to disregard a supervisor’s discriminatory animus and allow them to 
continue (or not continue) with the adverse employment action. 
Many recent cat’s paw cases have turned on whether the formal 
decisionmaker conducted an independent investigation before the adverse 
employment decision was made.184  Every circuit, even those adhering to the 
“tainted decision” approach, has held that an employer may escape cat’s paw 
liability with an effective independent investigation.185  While the Supreme 
Court in Staub viewed the independent investigation defense with skepticism, 
it admitted that when conducted properly, it will shield employers from 
liability.186  The Court was clear that employers can eliminate liability if an 
independent “investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to 
the supervisor’s original biased action.”187  While in BCI, the Tenth Circuit 
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stated that independent investigations need not be extensive,188 the Supreme 
Court in Staub should have held that a proper investigation should be as 
widespread as possible.  In fact, the Supreme Court missed a tremendous 
opportunity to identify the criteria for conducting effective independent 
investigations. 
The Supreme Court, at a minimum, should have identified the following as 
crucial steps that are inherent for an effective independent investigation: 1) 
establish a qualified person to oversee the independent investigation, 2) ensure 
that the decision is made upon a careful examination of well-documented 
evidence, and 3) conduct truth-seeking interviews with all of the parties 
involved. 
1. Establishment of a Qualified Person to Oversee the Independent 
Investigation 
Employers should first choose a qualified person within the company to 
independently evaluate the whether an adverse employment action should be 
made.189  This qualified person operates under the belief that an employee 
should be presumed innocent until proven guilty.190  A qualified independent 
decisionmaker also takes precautions to ensure that his biases do not enter the 
investigatory process.191  After all, by their nature, biases often operate below 
the level of conscious awareness.192  To combat the inadvertent biases, a 
qualified formal decisionmaker should cautiously approach every decision as if 
there may have been some prejudice hidden during the review. 
2. Careful Examination of Well-Documented Evidence 
Most importantly, the Supreme Court should have stated that adverse 
employment actions need to be based on substantial documented evidence.193  
There should be enough documentation that another reasonable person looking 
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at the information would also decide to fire the employee.194  The formal 
decisionmaker should keep a proper paper trail and remember that the evidence 
might eventually be read by the employee, a judge, or a jury.195  By keeping 
careful records of negative performance appraisals, the formal decisionmaker 
can establish the necessary documentation to ultimately terminate an 
underperforming employee.196  Documented records should be reviewed with 
caution because they may have been tainted by a biased employee or 
supervisor.197  If a biased supervisor created a report or a review, they would 
be contaminated with discriminatory animus and should not be relied upon.198  
Further, the threat of a lawsuit should not keep the formal decisionmaker from 
giving an employee a negative performance review.199  This fear could lead to 
evaluating employees under different standards.  The independent review, 
which is designed to eliminate biases, could then create its own discriminatory 
effect.200 
3. Conduct Truth-Seeking Interviews With All Parties Involved 
Employers should also be conducting truth-seeking interviews as a crucial 
step in every independent investigation.  Decisionmakers may naturally feel 
the need to rely on front-line managers and “to assume they are acting without 
a discriminatory motive,” but decisionmakers should “not rely solely on 
information provided by the employee’s supervisor.”201  Proper investigations 
should include an interview with the affected employee to get his or her side of 
the story.202  Other relevant witnesses should be interviewed to gather more 
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information and to get third party perspective.203  Only once all the appropriate 
parties have been interviewed should the formal decisionmaker then begin to 
make conclusions about the accuracy of the evidence.  Independent interviews 
of all the parties involved shows that the formal decisionmaker’s main concern 
is objectivity.204 
Some commentators argue that there is too much weight given to 
independent investigations because the formal decisionmaker’s true motives 
cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty.205  For instance, an 
independent formal decisionmaker may not be able to entirely remove himself 
or herself from the discriminatory animus because the decisionmaker is too far 
removed from employee.  If the formal decisionmaker is too far removed from 
the employee, he may be more inclined to “credit the views and opinions” of 
the biased supervisor than the employee “because of the supervisor’s relative 
place in the institutional hierarchy.”206  Further, there may also be situations 
where the formal decisionmaker is too closely intertwined with biased 
subordinate.  The formal decisionmaker’s friendships and allegiances have the 
potential to sabotage the independent investigation.  There may also be 
situations where the formal decisionmakers themselves hold a bias against the 
employee.207 
Regardless of the criticisms of the independent investigation, one simple 
fact remains: There are no viable alternatives to the independent investigation.  
Employers need a method by which they may filter through subordinate biases.  
Simply because a subordinate may have harbored some bias against an 
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inadequate employee, an employer should not be forever constrained from 
terminating that employee if a valid non-discriminatory reason calls for it. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past twenty years, the cat’s paw theory of liability has emerged as 
one of the most controversial issues in employment law.  When the Supreme 
Court decided Staub during its last term, it missed an opportunity to clarify 
important issues surrounding this complex theory.  A more detailed solution 
would not only have provided uniformity and assistance to the circuits, but 
most importantly, it would have also provided guidance to modern employers.  
When it fashioned the appropriate causation standard, the Supreme Court 
should have adopted a balanced causation standard in order limit the financial 
impact and burden on employers and to encourage the development of an 
unbiased workplace environment.  Also, instead of largely dismissing the 
independent investigation defense, the Supreme Court also should have 
validated it and provided employers with the specific elements that encompass 
an effective investigation.  At a minimum, an effective investigation should 
entail the establishment of a qualified person to conduct the investigation, a 
review of all the documented evidence, and truth-seeking interviews of all 
involved parties.  Unfortunately, the Staub decision appears to have ensured 
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